

THE **WEB** ACM
CONFERENCE



Bad Apples: Understanding the Centralized Security Risks in Decentralized Ecosystems

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


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Shanqing Guo¹

1. Shandong University 2. Jinan University 3. Alibaba Group




山东大学
SHANDONG UNIVERSITY




暨南大学
JINAN UNIVERSITY

 **Alibaba**

● INTRODUCTION



● INTRODUCTION



● RESEARCH OBJECTS

**CRYPTO
WALLETS**

**DECENTRALIZED
APPLICATIONS**


CENTRALIZATION



● THREAT MODEL

Decentralized platforms are benign, miners will not collude with each other.

Decentralized service providers as adversaries.




- **First-party Centralization**

The adversary integrates centralized services or backdoors into the decentralized service he developed.

- **Third-party Centralization**

The adversary, as a third party, supplies centralized components for decentralized services to contaminate decentralized ecosystems.



● CRYPTO WALLETS



Slope Wallet

Mobile Decentralized Exchange and Wallet



SENTRY


Application Performance Monitoring and Error Tracking



Slope used plaintext to
transmit logs to Sentry!

9,231 Wallets
\$6,000,000

● CRYPTO WALLETS



● CRYPTO WALLETS

SR#1 Anonymity Loss


SR#2 Private Key Leakage

SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services

SR#4 RPC Services

SR#5 Third-Party SDKs

CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS



Argent Wallet

● CRYPTO WALLETS

SR#1 Anonymity Loss



SR#2 Private Key Leakage

SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services

SR#4 RPC Services

SR#5 Third-Party SDKs

CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS



Bitcoin.com Wallet

● CRYPTO WALLETS

SR#1 Anonymity Loss



SR#2 Private Key Leakage

SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services

SR#4 RPC Services

SR#5 Third-Party SDKs

CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS



Trust Wallet



● CRYPTO WALLETS

SR#1 Anonymity Loss


SR#2 Private Key Leakage

SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services

SR#4 RPC Services

SR#5 Third-Party SDKs

CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS



Metamask Wallet

● CRYPTO WALLETS

SR#1 Anonymity Loss


SR#2 Private Key Leakage

SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services

SR#4 RPC Services

SR#5 Third-Party SDKs


CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS



Bitcoin.com Wallet



● DAPPS



● SMART CONTRACTS



```
1 constructor(){
2   _owner = msg.sender; // address public _owner;
3   _maxSupply = 100000; // uint public _maxSupply;
4   _totalSupply = 0; // uint public _totalSupply;
5 }
6 modifier onlyOwner() {
7   require(msg.sender == _owner);
8   _;
9 }
10 function mint(address to, uint amount) public onlyOwner {
11   //require(msg.sender == _owner); equals to onlyOwner().
12   require(_totalSupply + amount <= _maxSupply);
13   /* ... */
14 }
```

Access Control

● **SMART CONTRACTS**



SR#6 Overpowered Owner

- (a) Limited Liquidity**
- (b) Vulnerable Scarcity**
- (c) Mutable Metadata**
- (d) Mutable Parameters**

SR#7 Missing Events

CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS

● SMART CONTRACTS

```
1 function transfer(address to, uint amount) public {  
2     require(!_paused); // bool  
3     require(!_blacklist[msg.sender]); // mapping(address=>bool)  
4     /* ... */  
5 }
```

Limited Liquidity

```
1 event Transfer(address from, address to, uint amount);  
2 function transfer(address to, uint amount) public {  
3     /* ... */  
4     emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);  
5 }
```

Event

SR#6 Overpowered Owner

(a) Limited Liquidity

(b) Vulnerable Scarcity

(c) Mutable Metadata

(d) Mutable Parameters

SR#7 Missing Events

CENTRALIZED SECURITY RISKS

● DETECTION APPROACHES

✓ Function Check. (SR#1~4)


RQ1 Does the wallet require users to register or provide additional information before use? (SR#1)

RQ2 Does the wallet recommend users back up their private keys to the cloud? (SR#2)


RQ3 Whether the wallet has built-in centralized services and reminds users that these services are not decentralized. (SR#3)

RQ4 Can users modify RPC providers in the wallet? (SR#4)

✓ Semi-Automated Detection. (SR#5)



✓ Automated Tool. (SR#6, SR#7)



NAGA

● DATASETS

28 

**Ethereum website
recommended wallets**

131M Downloads



Google Play

110,506 

Ethereum on-chain contracts

11,753 High-value contracts
Total market cap exceeds 310B



Etherscan




Ethereum Wallets: <https://ethereum.org/en/wallets/find-wallet/>

Contracts Dataset: https://github.com/d0scoo1/naga_contracts

Etherscan Token Tracker: <https://etherscan.io/tokens>

Smart Contract Sanctuary: <https://github.com/tintinweb/smart-contract-sanctuary-ethereum>

FINDINGS



CRYPTO
WALLETS

SR#1 Anonymity Loss (AL)	8/28
SR#2 Private Key Leakage (PL)	7/28
SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services (BS)	19/28
SR#4 RPC Services (RS)	20/28
SR#5 Third-Party SDKs (TS)	20/28

Crypto Wallet	DLs	SR#1	SR#2	SR#3	SR#4	SR#5
Brave Wallet	100M+	○	○	◐	○	0
Coinbase Wallet	10M+	○	○	○	●	3
MetaMask	10M+	○	○	◐	○	2
Bitcoin.com Wallet	5M+	◐	Cloud	●	●	5
Exodus	1M+	○	○	○	●	0
Opera wallet	1M+	○	○	○	●	1
Status	1M+	○	○	○	○	0
TokenPocket	1M+	○	○	○	○	0
Coin98 Wallet	500K+	◐	Cloud	●	●	4
imToken	500K+	○	○	○	○	5
MEW Wallet	500K+	○	○	●	●	3
AlphaWallet	100K+	○	○	◐	○	1
Argent	100K+	●	Google	◐	●	6
Coin Wallet	100K+	○	○	◐	●	1
Guarda	100K+	○	○	●	●	0
Pillar	100K+	○	○	●	●	4
ZenGo	100K+	●	Google	●	●	10
Zerion Wallet	100K+	○	○	◐	●	4
1inch Wallet	50K+	○	Google	○	●	0
Loopring Wallet	50K+	●	○	○	●	1
AirGap Wallet	10K+	○	○	○	●	0
Bridge Wallet	10K+	◐	○	●	○	2
FoxWallet	10K+	○	○	◐	○	5
Gnosis Safe	10K+	○	○	○	●	2
Numio	10K+	●	Google	●	●	3
Rainbow	10K+	○	Google	●	●	3
Unstoppable	10K+	○	○	○	●	0
Aktionariat	1K+	●	○	●	●	1

● Security risk exists; ◐ Security risk maybe exists; ○ No security risk.

● FINDINGS

83.5%

**SMART
CONTRACTS**



11,419

high value
contracts



260 well-known
contracts

\$98B

Overpowered Owner

88.0%


Token contracts

● MITIGATIONS



- Choose wallets with large downloads
- Not provide any information to wallets
- Hide the actual IP address by use onion routing
- Run own blockchain nodes

SR#1 Anonymity Loss
SR#2 Private Key Leakage
SR#4 RPC Services






DEVELOPERS

- Use decentralized services
- Fulfill obligation to inform users
- Connect to multiple RPC services simultaneously
- Multi-signature contract as the owner

SR#3 Built-in Centralized Services
SR#5 Third-Party SDKs
SR#7 Missing Events
SR#4 RPC Services
SR#6 Overpowered Owner

SUMMARY





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THE WEB CONFERENCE 2023
AUSTIN, TEXAS, USA



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Thanks!


Speaker: Kailun Yan

kailun@mail.sdu.edu.cn

<https://dos.cool/>

NAGA: <https://github.com/d0scoo1/Naga>

Contract Dataset: https://github.com/d0scoo1/naga_contracts



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